Brian Burke's Next Trade - Part 4 - Tomas Kaberle and the "Time Machine" Trade

"Time Machine" Trades
Usually Involve Budget Teams

"Tomas Kaberle and the 'Time Machine' Trade" is part of a series of "Brian Burke's Next Trade" posts:

1. Brian Burke's Next Trade - Part 1
2. Brian Burke's Next Trade - Part 2 - Making Room for Prospects
3. Brian Burke's Next Trade - Part 3 - Catching the Big Fish

In essence, a "Time Machine" trade is where you trade a player in his declining playing years (when he is past 30 years old) for a player who will be part of your team's core in the immediate near future.  Presently, Tomas Kaberle is 32 years old.

Brian Burke has been trying for the past two years to pull off a "Time Machine" trade involving Tomas Kaberle.  He thought he had one with Boston Bruins before the 2009-10 season.  However, there was a significant misunderstanding.  Brian Burke thought Boston agreed to send Phil Kessel and its 2009 1st round draft pick for Tomas Kaberle.  Peter Chiarelli, Boston's Manager, thought he traded Phil Kessel for Tomas Kaberle and Toronto's 2009 1st round draft pick.

There was a reported trade with Philadelphia vetoed by Tomas Kaberle prior to Brian Burke arriving to Toronto.  It was alleged Cliff Fletcher, Toronto's Manager at the time, reached agreement with Philadelphia agreed to send 29 year-old Tomas Kaberle for 22 year-old Jeff Carter and Philadephia's  2008 1st round pick.  Tomas Kaberle has a conditional NTC (No Trade Clause) in his contract where it goes dormant during the summer when Toronto fails to make the playoffs.

Why has it been so difficult to trade Tomas Kaberle?  What can you expect in return for him?  What strategy should Brian Burke use to trade him?

History is always a good starting point to find possible answers to these questions.  Below is a list of all "Time Machine" trades since the lockout involving players older than 30 who have been All-Stars (representing their team at the NHL All-Star game) and Olympic Team players.  The ages of the players involved in the trade are in brackets.  Players who were 1st round drafts picks have their draft position listed after their age.  Highlighted in yellow are "Time Machine" trades that appear to be successful in yielding younger players.  Past Hart Trophy winners are in bold letters.

"Time Machine" Trades Since the Lockout
Date	Players Traded To		Players Acquired By
15-Nov-05	CBJ	Sergei Fedorov (35) 5th 2006 (Maxime Frechette)	ANA	Francois Beauchemin (25) Tyler Wright (32) 12th
30-Jan-06	CAR	Doug Weight (35) Erkki Rajamaki (26)	STL	1st 2006 (upgrade trade)               (Patrik Bergland) Mike Zigomannis (24) Jesse Boulerice (27) Magnus Kahnberg (25)
16-Dec-06	PHA	Alexei Zhitnik (33)	NYI	Freddie Meyer (26) 3rd 2007 (Mark Katic)
14-Feb-07	ATL	Alexei Zhitnik (33)	PHA	Braydon Coburn (21) 8th
15-Feb-07	NAS	Peter Forsberg (33) 5th	PHA	Scottie Upshall (23) 6th Ryan Parent (19) 18th 1st 2007 (traded for players)               (Scott Hartnell)               (Kimmo Timanen) 3rd 2007 (traded)
27-Feb-07	SJ	Bill Guerin (36)	STL	Ville Nieminen (29) 1st 2007 (David Perron)
27-Feb-07	NYI	Ryan Smyth (30) 6th	EDM	Robert Nilsson (21) 15th Ryan O'Marra (19) 15th 1st 2007 (Alex Plante)
22-Jun-07	FLA	Tomas Vokoun (31)	NAS	1st 2008 (upgrade trade)               (Colin Wilson) 2nd 2007 (Nick Spaling) 2nd 2008 (traded)
14-Dec-07	ANA	Doug Weight (37) Michal Birner (21) 7th 2007 (Paul Karpowich)	STL	Andy McDonald (30)
26-Feb-08	COL	Adam Foote (36)	CBJ	1st 2008 (traded for players)               (RJ Umberger) 4th 2008 (David Savard)
29-Jun-08	Edm	Lubomir Visnovsky (32)	LA	Jarret Stoll (26) Matt Greene (25)
26-Jun-09	PHA	Chris Pronger (34) 2nd Ryan Dingle (25)	ANA	Joffrey Lupul (26) 7th Luca Sbisa (20) 19th 1st 2009 (traded for picks)               (Kyle Palmieri)               (Matt Clark) 1st 2010 (Emerson Etem)
3-Jul-09	LA	Ryan Smyth (33) 6th	COL	Kyle Quincey (24) Tom Preissing (30) 5th 2010 (Luke Walker)
3-Mar-10	ANA	Lubomir Visnovsky (33)	EDM	Ryan Whitney (26) 5th 6th 2010 (Brandon Davidson)
19-Jun-10	NJ	Jason Arnott (35) 7th	NAS	2nd 2011 Matt Halischuk (22)
6-Jan-11	DAL	Jamie Langenbrunner (35)	NJ	3rd 2011 (conditonal 2nd)

When reviewing these trades you will notice a few things:

1. Budget teams typically acquire "Time Machine" trade players.
2. "Time Machine" trades are usually done as the trade deadline approaches.
3. Philadelphia Flyers have history of doing "Time Machine" trades.
4. Except for the Flyers trade, returns in "Time Machine" trades have been weak in past three seasons.
5. Boston Bruins do not participate in "Time Machine" trades.

It makes sense for budget teams to seek out "Time Machine" trades when making a cup run.  This is there only chance to acquire these types of players.  Their budgets simply don't have room to have these large salaries for a complete season.  As a result, they are not in the market to sign them as free agents.

Here are the ramifications on Burke's quest to "Time Machine" trade Tomas Kaberle:

1. Market probably reduced to just Philadelphia because of Kaberle's NTC (No Trade Clause).  Doubtful Kaberle waives it for a budget team.
2. Philadelphia only has $5.064 mil room in next year's cap to extend Kaberle.  Getting a contract extension as part of the trade is the rumoured requirement for Kaberle to waive his NTC.

"Time Machine" trading Tomas Kaberle may just be a forlorn hope.  This is unfortunate since Burke has targeted James Van Riemsdyk on Philadelphia.  However, Burke does have some factors working in his favour:

1. Philadelphia needs to improve its power play.  It is currently ranked 17th in the NHL and below the league average.
2. Moving Van Riemsdyk creates cap room for Philadelphia to extend Kaberle.
3. Paul Holmgren, Philadelphia's Manager, values Kaberle.  Remember his willingness to trade Jeff Carter for Kaberle.
4. Brian Burke can make the deal bigger by adding Kris Versteeg.  However, it requires Toronto taking back Brayden Colburn or Matt Carle so Flyers comply with next year's cap when extending Kaberle.  
5. Toronto can take any unwanted cap salary from Philadelphia so Flyers can do additional trades.  For example, Holmgren may want to shed Nikolai Zherdev from their roster.  Shedding the cap salary and opening a third spot on their 50 Active Player roster.

James Van Riemsdyk and Matt Carle or Brayden Colburn for Tomas Kaberle (with contract extension) and Kris Versteeg might be too costly for Philadelphia.  Ultimately, it will come down to Paul Holmgren having to choose between "wanting to win the trade" versus "wanting to win the cup".  It will be interesting to watch.

Post Script 14-Feb-2011

Kris Versteeg was traded to Philadelphia Flyers for a 1st and 3rd round pick within two hours of posting this blog entry.  This trade makes it almost impossible to move Tomas Kaberle to Philadelphia since they are capped out.  Brian Burke and Peter Chiarelli are now forced to deal with each other again!  Fans from both teams must be holding their breadth.

Post Script 18-Feb-2011

Another observation worth noting is the importance of receiving 1st round draft picks when making "Time Machine" trades.  You see them in many "Time Machine" trades.  These draft picks are usually later traded for a top prospect or a higher draft pick.  In essence, when acquiring a 1st round draft pick, the Manager acquires an asset that holds its value over time and can be moved to any team regardless of its cap and budget restrictions.  Furthermore, 1st round draft picks do not have NTC or NMC (No Movement Clause).

Post Script Part II 18-Feb-2011

Tomas Kaberle has been traded for Joe Colborne (drafted 16th overall in 2008 Entry Draft) and Boston's 2011 1st pick and a conditional 2nd pick from 2011.  Boston's 2nd pick depends on Kaberle either resigning with Boston or Boston advancing to the Stanley Cup finals.

Only Chris Pronger and Peter Forsberg have garnered a larger return in a "Time Machine" trade.  Both of them happen to be former Hart Trophy winners and Top 5 draft picks.

However, if the initial strategy was to package Kris Versteeg to magnify Kaberle's value, Burke can claim success with Colborne, two 1st round picks, and a conditional 2nd round pick.  In fact, splitting up Versteeg to get a 1st when the strategy wasn't working increased the return and applied pressure on Boston to make a move.

As a result, the combined returns for Kaberle and Versteeg compare nicely to Forsberg and Pronger.

Traditionally, Boston has never acquired a "Time Machine" player.  They usually acquire their players such as Marc Savard, Zdano Chara, Tim Thomas, and Mark Ryder through free agency.

Traditionally, Brian Burke does not acquire prospects and 1st round picks when doing a "Time Machine" trade.  In the past, he has acquired Francois Beauchemin and Andy McDonald in these trades.  He even stated his current objective is to get players.

Brian Burke has shown tremendous flexibility.  In doing so, he has pulled a rabbit out of the hat by getting "Hart Trophy winner" like returns for Kaberle and Versteeg.

Tweet



Follow @Leafschatter 

An Honest Conversation About First Round Draft Picks

In 1963, Clarence Campbell, NHL President,
Introduced the First Amateur Draft

Lately, the media has written a lot about how first round draft picks are critical to getting elite players.  They have vigorously asserted trading a first round draft pick is tantamount to giving away the next Alex Ovechkin, Sydney Crosby, or Steven Stamkos, each being an example of a "super" elite player.  This type of talk comes across as "being a little over the top".

However, I remember hearing similar sentiments back in the mid70s when Montreal Canadiens were hoarding first round draft picks and building a new dynasty.  This gives us cause to take a closer look at NHL (National Hockey League) history to examine "super" elite players and drafting elite players in the first round.

First, allow me to explain how I differentiate between elite and "super" elite players throughout NHL history.  I rely on 1st and 2nd Team All-Star honours to objectively categorize someone as an elite player.  An honour first awarded after the 1930-31 season.

We can categorize any player who receives this honour as an elite player.  A "super" elite player is simply identified as any player who received at least five 1st Team All-Star honours.  This amount typically represents a player dominating his position during both his peak and non-peak production years (ages 24 to 26 for forwards).

After reviewing the data, two conclusions can be reached:

(1) Don't expect "super" elite players to be available in every draft;

(2) Since 1997 Entry Draft, Elite forwards are rarely available after the second pick.

Let's explore this further.

First, let's start by reviewing the "super" elite players.  You will find the complete list below ordered by birth year.  Young players who seem to have a chance of becoming a "super" elite player are included at the end of the list.  To put it differently, Steven Stamkos and any young player receiving 1st/2nd Team All-Star honours before reaching their peak years (24 years old for forwards, 26 for defencemen and goalies) are included at the end.

"Super" Elite NHL Players - with at Least Five 1st All-Star Teams

Player	Pos	Number of 1st All-Star Awards	Number of 2nd All-Star Awards	Birth Year	Age When First Awarded 1st All-Star	Drafted
Eddie Shore	D	7	2	1903	29
Bill Durnan	G	6	0	1917	27
Maurice Richard	RW	8	6	1921	23
Ted Lindsay	LW	8	1	1925	22
Doug Harvey	D	10	1	1927	26
Red Kelly	D	6	2	1927	23
Gordie Howe	RW	12	9	1928	22
Glenn Hall	G	7	4	1931	25
Jean Beliveau	C	6	4	1931	23
Pierre Pilote	D	5	3	1931	32
Bobby Hull	LW	10	2	1939	20
Stan Mikita	C	6	2	1940	21
Phil Esposito	C	6	2	1943	26
Ken Dryden*	G	5	1	1947	25	14*
Bobby Orr	D	8	1	1948	19
Brad Park*	D	5	2	1948	21	2*
Guy Lafleur	RW	6	0	1951	23	1
Denis Potvin	D	5	2	1953	22	1
Mike Bossy	RW	5	3	1957	23	15
Raymond Bourque	D	13	6	1960	19	8
Wayne Gretzky	C	8	7	1961	19
Chris Chelios	D	5	2	1962	26	40
Mario Lemeiux	C	6	4	1965	22	1
Dominic Hasek	G	6	0	1965	28	207
Patrick Roy	G	5	3	1965	20	51
Luc Robitaille	LW	5	3	1966	21	171
Niklas Lidstrom	D	9	2	1970	27	53
Jaromir Jagr	RW	7	1	1970	22	5
Duncan Keith	D	1	0	1983	26	54
Alex Ovechkin	LW	5	0	1985	20	1
Mike Green	D	2	0	1985	23	29
Dion Phaneuf	D	1	0	1985	22	9
Evgeni Malkin	C	2	0	1986	21	2
Sidney Crosby	C	1	1	1987	19	1
Patrick Kane	RW	1	0	1988	20	1
Drew Doughty	D	0	1	1989		2
Steven Stamkos	C	0	0	1990		1

* Draft of amateur players who either were not on an NHL sponsored junior team or not on an NHL protected list of sponsored teams and their affiliates.  6 NHL teams had 52 sponsored junior teams along with up to 3 teams in lower classifications (junior B, juvenile, & midget) affiliated to each sponsored junior team. NHL teams maintained a protected list of 18 players from each sponsored junior team (and their affiliations) making up an 952 protected players ranging from ages 14 (maybe even lower) to 20.

When examining the list of "super" elite players from NHL history, a few things jump out at us:
(1) Expect one to appear once every two years;
(2) Historically, very few are acquired with first overall pick;
(3) There is a big gap between players born in 1970 and 1985;
(4) Players likely to become "super" elite are getting picked first since 2004 Entry Draft

Because of the disparity in peak performance years between forwards and other positions (defencemen and goalies) and our interest in taking a closer look at post 1997 drafts, you will find below a list reduced to just only "super" elite forwards.

"Super" Elite NHL Forwards - with at Least Five 1st Team All-Stars

Player	Pos	Number of 1st All-Star Awards	Number of 2nd All-Star Awards	Birth Year	Age When First Awarded 1st All-Star	Drafted
Maurice Richard	RW	8	6	1921	23
Ted Lindsay	LW	8	1	1925	22
Gordie Howe	RW	12	9	1928	22
Jean Beliveau	C	6	4	1931	23
Bobby Hull	LW	10	2	1939	20
Stan Mikita	C	6	2	1940	21
Phil Esposito	C	6	2	1943	26
Guy Lafleur	RW	6	0	1951	23	1
Mike Bossy	RW	5	3	1957	23	15
Wayne Gretzky	C	8	7	1961	19
Mario Lemeiux	C	6	4	1965	22	1
Luc Robitaille	LW	5	3	1966	21	171
Jaromir Jagr	RW	7	1	1970	22	5
Alex Ovechkin	LW	5	0	1985	20	1
Evgeni Malkin	C	2	0	1986	21	2
Sidney Crosby	C	1	1	1987	19	1
Patrick Kane	RW	1	0	1988	20	1
Steven Stamkos	C	0	0	1990		1

From this list, you can see historically, "super" elite forwards are available about once every four years.  However, there was a 15-year gap between Jaromir Jagr and Alex Ovechkin.  In addition, Alex Ovechkin seems to be leading an unimaginable wave of great players.  Is this a new trend, or simply a blip in NHL history?

Again, please take note at the recent success of teams identifying and drafting these players with their first overall pick.  This requires a closer look.  Please notice the chart below compiled of draft success for picking elite forwards in the first round.

We will ignore the Amateur Drafts from 1963, when first introduced, until 1968 because the best junior hockey players were not available.  They were on protected lists of the NHL teams who sponsored their junior team.  We also exclude the Entry Drafts after 2005 because the players are too early in their careers to be included in this assessment.  In fact, there may be a player or two from the 2003 Entry Draft, such as Corey Perry, who will likely receive an NHL 1st/2nd Team All-Star honour within their career.  However, it will only have a marginal impact on the results.

Drafting Elite Forwards - 1st/2nd Team All-Star Recipients

	1997 to 2005 Entry Drafts			1969-78 Amateur Drafts & 1979-96 Entry Drafts			1970 to 1973 Amateur Drafts
Draft Pos	Elite Fwds	Tot Fwds	Hit Rate	Elite Fwds	Tot Fwds	Hit Rate	Elite Fwds	Tot Fwds	Hit Rate
1	5	7	71.4%	7	18	38.9%	2	3	66.7%
2	4	8	50.0%	4	21	19.0%	1	3	33.3%
3	1	5	20.0%	3	18	16.7%	1	3	33.3%
4	0	5	0.0%	5	21	23.8%	2	4	50.0%
5	1	5	20.0%	3	10	30.0%	1	1	100.0%
6	0	7	0.0%	1	17	5.9%	0	2	0.0%
7	0	5	0.0%	1	21	4.8%	1	4	25.0%
8	0	7	0.0%	1	15	6.7%	1	4	25.0%
9	0	4	0.0%	1	17	5.9%	0	2	0.0%
10	0	4	0.0%	2	18	11.1%	1	4	25.0%
11	0	8	0.0%	1	13	7.7%	0	3	0.0%
12	0	5	0.0%	0	19	0.0%	0	2	0.0%
13	0	8	0.0%	0	12	0.0%	0	1	0.0%
14	0	4	0.0%	1	16	6.3%	1	3	33.3%
15	0	7	0.0%	2	16	12.5%	0	1	0.0%
16	0	8	0.0%	2	13	15.4%	0	2	0.0%
17	1	5	20.0%	0	16	0.0%
18	0	5	0.0%	0	17	0.0%
19	0	5	0.0%	1	15	6.7%
20	0	8	0.0%	1	11	9.1%
21	0	2	0.0%	0	10	0.0%
22	0	5	0.0%	0	2	0.0%
23	0	5	0.0%	1	3	33.3%
24	0	6	0.0%	0	5	0.0%
25	0	7	0.0%	0	2	0.0%
26	0	3	0.0%
27	0	4	0.0%
28	0	4	0.0%
29	0	2	0.0%
30	0	3	0.0%
3 to 16	2	82	2.4%	23	226	10.2%	8	36	22.2%

Please notice, in recent drafts from 1997 to 2005, most teams were successful in getting an elite player when selecting a forward with a top two pick.  This is dramatically better than the success experienced from 1969 to 1996.  Conversely, only 2.2% of the forwards drafted after the top two picks in the first round become elite forwards.  This number can still go up as mentioned previously.  But, not by much.

Another extraordinary time for drafting elite forwards was from 1970 to 1973 that saw 11 of the 42 forwards drafted in the first round become 1st/2nd Team All-Stars.  It must have felt as if it was raining pennies from heaven for NHL managers who hoarded first round draft picks. NHL teams had exceptional success with top ten picks.  This along with "super" elite players Guy Lafleur and Denis Potvin drafted first overall heavily influenced everyone's perception on the importance of first round draft picks.

This success nose-dived from 1974 to 1978 when only 2 of 64 forwards selected in the first round (Mike Bossy and Clark Gillies) became elite forwards.  Coincidently, this was the same time when NHL and WHA (World Hockey Association) had a bidding war over junior star players.  Some of the very best amateur prospects during this time turned into fool's gold for some WHA franchises as they outbid NHL teams for the highest rated prospects such as Dennis Sobchuck, Cam Connar, Pat Price, and Ron Chipperfield. 

From 1969 to 1996, a first round pick was important because you had a decent chance (at least 10%) of getting an elite player from any draft position in the first round.  Perhaps, teams were making mistakes with their high picks making elite players available later in the first round.  As a result, most teams held on to their first round draft picks regardless of where they expected to finish.

Starting from 1997, there seems to be a dramatic change to how teams performed in the Entry Draft where they now gobble up the best players with the first two picks.  There appears to be an improvement in scouting where teams now rarely miss with their first overall pick.

The "You Can't Win the Cup without the Draft" Myth

Many hockey experts strongly assert you can't win the Stanley Cup without keeping your first round draft picks.  This is simply not true.  Philadelphia Flyers won two Stanley Cups (1973-74 and 1974-75) by trading first round draft picks.  They acquired goalie Bernie Parent (1st Team All-Star 1973-74 & 74-75, Conn Smythe Trophy winner 1973-74 & 74-75) by including their 1973 1st pick (Bob Neely) in a package to Toronto Maple Leafs.  Philadelphia also acquired right winger Reggie Leach (2nd Team All-Star 1975-76, Conn Smythe Trophy winner 1975-76) in a trade with California Seals by also including their 1974 1st pick (Ron Chipperfield) in the trade package.

Although Montreal Canadiens were notorious for collecting first round draft picks, they were not afraid   to trade them or pass on getting more of them.  When drafting Guy Lafleur first overall, they had an opportunity to acquire the second overall pick (Marcel Dionne) from Detroit Red Wings for Terry Harper, Phil Myre, and Claude Larose.  Montreal passed on drafting Marcel Dionne because they already had enough front line centres in Peter Mahovlich and Jacques Lemaire.  The following year, Montreal had the second overall pick from an acquisition with California Seals.  However, they traded it to Atlanta Flames who used it to draft centre Tom Lysiak.  Montreal was only interested in using the pick to acquire Denis Potvin.

Conclusion

Ultimately, an NHL manager uses the first round draft pick to acquire top hockey talent.  It shouldn't matter if the talent is acquired using the draft pick or trading it.  However, it does take shrewd foresight to comprehend what potential player you are passing on when trading the pick.  Especially when the pick has a chance of becoming a top-two pick.  But, building a team by blindly relying on top-two picks while expecting a never-ending annual parade of "super" elite player might be a little too simple minded.  This will be especially true if hockey goes through another 13 year drought for this type of player. 

Afterthoughts on How Scouting Has Improved

When NHL teams sponsored junior teams and had rights to the sponsored team's players and affiliated team's players, they focused on scouting players in their early teens.  NHL teams scouted Bobby Orr when he was 13 years old.  Boston Bruins acquired him by simply sponsoring his junior team.  By age 14, he was on Boston Bruins protected list.

The sponsorship system ended when some junior team operators broke ranks in 1966, resulting in the NHL adopting the amateur draft as the primary way for acquiring amateur players.  Part of this change included changing the age of eligibility for playing NHL hockey from 18 to 20 years old.  Scouts had to adjust from scouting 14 to 17 year old players to scouting 19 year old players.  Coincidently, NHL started its Central Scouting Service in 1976 as way of pooling scouting resources so financially constrained teams could benefit from better scouting.

Just as they were getting the hang of this new scouting system, the Amateur draft changed to the Entry draft in 1979 because of the merger with WHA.  WHA had "underage" (under 20 years old) players (specifically Michel Goulet) prepared to make a court challenge on the age restriction.  To avoid the court action, NHL "ended" the Amateur draft and came up with the Entry Draft, which included a lower age of eligibility, 19 years old in 1979 and 18 years old by 1980.

By the mid-80s, many NHL scouts were characterizing the drafting of 18 year olds as a "crap shoot".  Elite players Brett Hall (born 1964, 1st Team All-Star 1989-90, 90-91, 91-92) and Tim Kerr (born 1960, 2nd Team All-Star 1986-87) were completely overlooked in the draft and signed NHL contracts as amateur free agents.

But, as before, NHL scouts started to adjust to the new reality.  Then, communism started to crumble at the end of the 80s.  Now, NHL teams had to learn how to scout and draft east European players.

Since then, there appears to be stability for the past two decades when it comes to scouting and drafting amateur players.  Perhaps this is why a first overall pick is now a near certainty; a second over pick all is a 50/50 proposition; and every other first round pick is now a long shot  for getting elite forwards.

Tweet



Follow @Leafschatter